11N(CIASSIFIFII Introduction
Deep within the foundations of logic and probability, the architects and builders have left a missing stone. Roughly, this foundation stone is to logical propositions what fractions are to integers. Now, with the advent of the computer age, attempts to incorporate more of human intelligence into machines (so-called artificial intelligence) have exposed this lack of foundation and led compute: scientists to resort to sub-optimal methods to compute actions from information via some "reasonable" data fusion algorithm. Hence there is no
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Among the partially overlapping techniques there are:
a. The fuzzy sets and other fuzzy language modifiers and methods of L. Zadeh [5] , b. The belief functions of Dempster-Shafer [7] , and c. The probability logic approach of P. Calabrese [2] and [3] .
The author will leave it to the many enthusiasts of fuzziness to crystallize the imprecise and generally wasteful information combining techniques commonly -mpyIcyCd by .hc common man as he commonly goes bumbling through life. This is not to say that we do not need approximate methods by which to combine information in the face of the default of logic and probability to provide more precise methods. Even though fuzzy methods tend to distort information at least these methods come up with solutions, and often an exact solution is not necessary. Nevertheless, science should continually seek to purge all unnecessary natural language ambiguities from its formal mathematical descriptions, not meekly incorporate theml A new theory should also, if possible, merge with the older theory where the older is tested and applicable. That the fuzzy approach does not do. Before one adopts a distorting technique, no matter how computationally tractable it may be, one should first extend the classical theories of logic and probability as far as possible, and secondly, merge with them on the boundary of their domain of application. However, except for a few authors (for example, J. Pearl [6] and his important work in conditional independence) this has not been attempted by the new generation of uncertainty workers in so-called artificial intelligence. Instead, many researchers have publicly discounted the practicality of probability theory as a method for reasoning with uncertainty -a nCt!in that has prompted P. Cheeseman [4] to make a "defense of probability theory".
Another technique for reasoning with uncertainty is the belief function approach of Dempster-Shafer [7] which, while striving to be consistent with probability theory, addresses thp problem of determining the support for propositions arising from even mutually inconsistent evidence.
The third approach to dealing with uncertainty is actually the oldest. G. Boole himself, the father of the algebra of logic, was developing an algebra of logic and probability (see T.
Hailperin's cogent account [8] ) but he died before completing the work. His unfinished algebraic development was then abbreviated by his successors, who attached his name to the resulting algebra.
In 1932, 1934 and later in 195G, S. Mazurkiewicz [9] , [101 and 111] used A. TarsKi's 112], [13 1 new theory of algebraic logic to approach the problem of conditioning in an algebraic setting, but he did not get very far before his death. At the same time N.
Kolmogorov [28] was laying down his successful axiomatization of probability theory and he realized that he could not follow logic in equating "if p then q" to "q or not p".
Already, in 1913, B. Russell and A. N. Whitehead [1] had made truth tables and so-called material implication the standard form of implication in logic, and this worked fairly well for 2-valued logic, but Kolmogorov found it to be inappropriate for probability theory. It has also been known at least since 1975, [2] and [3] , that the probability P(q v p') of the material conditional is, in general, greater than the conditional probability P(qlp) of q given p, unless either P(p) = 1 or P(qlp) = 1. Furthermore, if p = 0 then q v p' is certain (=1) but P(qlp) is undefined. This telltale inadequacy of material implication for representing "if -then -" has been noticed by generations of introductory logic students who have questioned why "if p then q" should be true or "valid" in case p is false. This question by pre-indoctrinated logic students has all too often been squelched by their instructors, who blithely appealed to the assignment of exactly two truth values to show that "if p then q" must be equivalent to "q or not p". Consequently if p is false then "not p"
is true, and so too is (q v p'), whatever the truth value of qI Thus (the argument goes) "if p then q" is true (valid) when p is false.
Nevertheless, a good scientist does not include cases in his sample for which the premise of his hypothesis is false; he does not count such cases as positive evidence of his hypothesis irrespective of the truth of his conclusion. Nor does a scientist report the probability that either the conclusion of his hypothesis is true or its premise false; rather, he reports the conditional probability of the conclusion of his hypothesis given that its premise is true;
and so too must those who would consistently quantify the truth content of partially true statements.
Besides this divergence between the treatments of "if -then -" in the domains of logic versus probability, there also tends to be an inadequate distinction made in logic between
propositions that are partially true and propositions that are wholly true. Generally, in a Boolean algebra a proposition need not be either true in all models (interpretaticns, worlds) or false in all models; a proposition can be true in some and false in others, thus allowing it to have a non-trivial probability. Nevertheless, the lack of a commonly accepted algebraic context for both logic and probability has made the very meaning of the "probability of a proposition" controversial. This is true in spite of the fact that G. Boole [29] , R. Carnap and R. C. Jeffrey [30] & [31] , H. Gaifman [32] , D. Scott and P. Kraus [33] , E. W. Adams [19] , and T. Hailperin [8] have all defined the probability of a proposition as the probability of its extension set of models, i.e., the probability of the set of models (interpretations, worlds) in which the proposition is true.
Others who have contributed to the expansion of probability logic that should be mentioned realized the crucial importance of conditional events, conducted a comprehensive historical review concerning the problem of conditioning [21] , and later contributed to the algebraic foundations of conditionals, initiated new directions for research and discovered significant new results [22] . (I would like to thank these colleagues for discovering the work of G.
Schay and B. Sobocinski, and for pointing out similarities between the author's system and those of Schay, Sobocinski and Adams.)
The next section begins with a probability space and defines propositions (a la B. De Finetti [14] ) as indicator functions defined on the elementary set of occurrences of a probability space. The meaning of a proposition being partially true or wholly true is defined in the context of the algebraic logic of propositions (see, for instance, Chang and Keis'er [26] .)
The probability of each proposition is then defined in terms of a probability measure on the extensionally associated models (interpretations) that satisfy those propositions.
Conditional propositions (qlp), "q given p", are next defined as domain-restricted Pmeasurable indicator functions which can be combined by "and", "or", "not" and "given"
resulting in another such conditional proposition. The resulting system of conditionals can be represented as a 3-valued logic, as predicted by a recent theorem of I. R. Goodman [22, and this book]. The third value does not represent uncertainty but rather inapplicabilityfalseness of the premise of the conditional proposition. (Uncertainty is automatically represented by non-atomic propositions, that thereby leave various possible facts unspecified.) A new formula is given for the probability of the disjunction, (qlp) v (sir), of two conditional expressions, thereby generalizing the well-known formula P(q v p)= P(q) + P(p) -P(q A p). A non-trivial formula for the conjunction of two conditionals is also proved.
In the subsequent section on deduction, two types of dcduclion in a Boolean algebra are distinguished. One of these types splits into four non-equivalent type-of dcduction in the realm of conditionals resulting in at least five different kinds of deduction. These types of deduction are characterized in terms of relationships between the original unconditioned propositions.
Formal Development
Propositions, Probability Spaces and Indicator Functions:
is a probability space then the characteristic function of each P-measuraole subset B, B E B, defines a unique P-measurable indicator function q: -Q -4 {0,1} from Q to the 2-element Boolean Algebra {0,1} as fol!ows:
q is a "proposition" in the sense that for each co e 0, either q is true for (o (i.e. q(co) = 1) or q is false for (o (i.e. q(wo) = 0). Let L denote the set of all propositions of P.
Conversely, each r-measurable indicator function q defines a unique P-measurable subset B, B c B by
B is the P-measurable subset on which q is true, and P(B) is the probability measure of the partial truth of q, and so P(q) = P(q-l(1)).
In this correspondence between measurable subsets (probabilistic events) and measurable Axioms of Boolean Algebra: A Boolean algebra, as formulated by T. Hailperin [8] , is a set of propositions L (including two constants 0 and 1) that is closed under the three operations "and" (juxtaposition or A), "or" (v) and "not" (') and that satisfies these axioms:
(pq)r = p(qr), (pv q) v r = pv (qv r), 
In terms of the unconditioned propositions p and q this is
(qlp) is a "conditional proposition" in the sense that if p is true on o) then (qlp) is either true on 0) or false on Co depending on the truth value of q. If p is false on o, we say that (qlp) does not apply (i.e., is undefined) for wo. (qlp) is q, restricted to p-1 (1), the subset on which p is true. The set of all conditional propositions of P will be denoted L/L.
Conversely, each such ordered pair of P-measurable indicator functions (qip) defines a unique ordered pair, (BIA), of P-measurable subsets where A = p-1(1) and B = q 1 (1). A is the measurable subset on which p is true and B is the measurable subset on which q is true. B n A is the measurable subset of A on which q is also true, and for non-zero P(A), P(B n A) / P(A) is the conditional probability of q given p, denoted P(qlp).
Boolean Operations: The operations "or" (v), "and" (juxtaposition or A) and "not" (), defined on the Boolean algebra (or sigma-algebra) 1B of events of P naturally generate operations on the indicator functions via disjunction, conjunction and negation in the 2-element Boolean algebra {0,1} as follows:
Here, the operations on the right hand side are in the 2-element Boolean algebra.
Note further that the first two operations can be expressed in terms of the minimum and maximum functions on {0,1}:
pq = min {p, q}
Together with the Boolean axioms and truth assignments the set of propositions L forms a Boolean logic, which will formally be denoted L.
In this framework each probabilistic outcome The above approach to probability logic starts with a probability space P = (.. B, P) and generates a Boolean algebra L of propositions, each proposition of which has a probability.
Another possible approach is to assume a probability measure on a given Boolean algebra of propositions and thereby induce a probability measure on the models of that Boolean algebra. Still another way is to assume a probability measure on the models of a given
Boolean algebra and induce a measure on the associated propositions. For the latter approach see P. Calabrese [3] .
Now it is known that not every Boolean algebra admits a probability measure P. Nor does every s-algebra B admit a probability measure P. These pathological cases will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that if a Boolean algebra is finite or at least atomic then there is no problem establishing a probability measure on it.
Equivalence of Conditional Propositions: Having defined conditional propositions as indicator functions, the equivalence of two conditional propositions is easy to define: So p = r. The subset of p-1 (1) on which (qip) equals 1 is (q<
Similarly, the subset of
Since these subsets are equal, qp = sr.
Conversely, if p = q and qp = sr then (qlp) and (sir) have the common domain p-1 (1).
Furthermore, on p-1(1), which is also r-1
Similarly, on r-
The equivalence class of conditional propositions containing the conditional proposition 
Note that the conditionals {(qJ0): q E LI form an equivalence class of wholly undefined condilinls ---conditionals that have impossible premises. Note also that for every conditional proposition (qlp), (qlp) = (qplp).
Definition 4:
A conditional proposition (qlp) is said to be in reduced form if qp = p.
Note that if (qlp) is in reduced form, then P(qlp) = P(q)/P(p). 
It is instructive to note that in
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in this paper a conditional that is undefined for a particular o) will (for that (,)) have no effect upon any other conditional with which it may be disjoined or conjoined or which it may condition. That is, if (slr)(w) is undefined then (slr)(,) acts like an operational identity with respect to disjunction, conjunction and when acting as a premise.
Furthermore, when acting as a conclusion, such a conditional results in an undefined
conditional no matter what the premise. This corresponds to the usual way people handle inapplicable conditionals in practice. These assumptions can be expressed succinctly as follows:
Axioms of Conditional Probability Logic: Let c be an arbitrary conditional proposition and let d be a conditional proposition that is undefined on (,), i.e., d = (sir) where r(o) = 0:
With this understanding, (also see Dubois & Prade [20] ), the extensions of the three operations to conditionals takes the following natural functional form:
Definition 5: For arbitrary conditionals (qlp) and (sir),
Theorem 2: in terms of a single conditional of the original propositions q, p, s, and r, these three operations become:
Proof of Theorem 2: The result follows by using the equations 4, 5 and 9 to express (qlp)(o)) and (sir)(o)) in terms of the original unconditioned propositions q, p, s, & r, and then collecting cases. For instance, the formula for disjunction goes as follows:
9 r (qiP)(() v (slr)(o ), if (qlp)(w,)) and (slr)(o,) are defined,
Note, for instance, that if (slr)(o) is undefined, i.e. when r(o)) = 0, then
With the operations of "and" (juxtaposition or A), "or" (v) and "not" (') the set L/L of ordered pairs (qip) of propositions includes an isomorphic copy of the original Boolean algebra of propositions according to the identification
and for any fixed non-zero proposition p, the conditionals ((qlp): all q e L} form a Boolean algebra, which will be denoted L/p. But it is not true that as a whole L/L together with these three operations forms a Boolean algebra. More on this later.
While the above formula for the disjunction (v) of two conditionals is given in reduced form, the formulas for the other two operations are not. In reduced form these other two It is interesting to note that De Morgan's formulas have a counterpart here:
using that (p')' = p. That proves the first formula. Using the first formula the dual formula follows:
With respect to priority of operations, when parentheses are omitted, negation (') takes precedence and then conjunction (juxtaposition or A) and then disjunction (v) and then conditioning ( I ). Thus (sr I q v p') means (sr) I (q v (p')).
The Conditional Closure: To obtain closure of operations in !JL, the conditioning process must be extended to the ordered pairs themselves ---to conditional conditionals.
These are of the form (qlP) i (sir). [Those of the mixed forms, ((qlp) I s) and (q I (sir))
for propositions q, p, s, and r, can be expressed as (qlp) I (sil) and (qil) I (sir)
respectively.]
Definition 6: For arbitrary conditionals (qlp) and (sir), define
The following result reduces a conditional conditional to a single conditional of the original propositions.
Theorem 4: For arbitrary conditionals (qlp) and (sir) (qIp) I (sir) = q I (p (s v r')).
Proof of Theorem 4: As with the proof of the other operations above, the result follows by using the definition of (qlp)(w) to express (qlp)((o) and (slr)(co) in terms of the original unconditioned propositions q, p, s, & r, and then collecting and rephrasing the cases: 
undefined, ii (s v r')(co) = 0
Note that when the premise conditional (sir) is undefined (i.e. r = 0) it has no effect on the conclusion conditional (qlp).
Corollary to Theorem 4:
Applying the above theorem to the mixed form cases mentioned above yields:
(q I (sir)) = (q (s v r'))
Note that as a condition (sir) is equivalent to (q v p').
The collection L/L of all conditional propositions under the four operations "and" Note that a particular conditional proposition may be true in some co, false in other (0 and undefined in still other co. It is not accurate (except in a categorical Boolean algebra) to say without regard to a particular (o that each conditional proposition (qlp) is either true, false or undefined.
Note also that the third truth value is designated U for "undefined" not U for "uncertain".
Perhaps this value is best expressed as "inapplicable". It is not a value between 0 and 1; it is a completely separate value.
The truth tables for the operations on conditional propositions (qlp) and (sir) easily follow by considering all possible assignments of T, F, and U (1, 0 and Undefined) to the initial propositions and then applying the operations on conditionals:
It can be seen that with an appropriate extension of the functions max and min to include the additional domain value U, "or" corresponds to max, and "and" corresponds to min. For an elaboration on these matters see [3] , p. 226-7.
Another interesting algebraic consequence of the conditional closure operations in L/L is "non-monotonicity" [34] . Unlike the situation in a Boolean algebra, it is not true that the Thus the disjunction of two conditionals (with mutually inconsistent premises) is false when I fail to satisfy each separate conditional when it applies.
It turns out that when the premises of two conditionals are disjoint it doesn't matter whether the conditionals are disjoined or conjoined! The result is the same in English and in the conditional closure algebra. More on this later.
Probability in L/L: Since complex conditional expressions can be reduced in L/L to a single conditional of Boolean expressions, they all have an implied conditional probability.
For the disjunction of any two conditional propositions (qlp) and (sir), the probability can be determined according to the following formula:
For any conditional propositions (qlp) and (sjr), P(p) f 0 * P(r),
P((qlp) v (sir)) = P(p I p v r) P(qlp) + P(r I p v r) P(sr) -P(qpsr I p v r)
Note that for p = r, this reduces to the ordinary probability of a disjunction.
Proof of Theorem 5: P((qlp) v (sir)) = P(qp v sr I p v r)
=P(qPlpv r) + P(srlpv r) -P(qpsrIpv r)
=P((qlp) I p v r) P(p ip v r) + P((slr) I p v r) P(r p v r) -P(qpsr p v r) =P(q I p(p v r)) P(p p v r) + P(s I r(pv r)) P(r p v r) -P(qpsr p v r) = P(qlp) P(p I p v r) + P(sir) P(r p v r) -P(qpsr I p v r).
There is also a non-trivial formula for P((qlp) A (sir)):
Theorem 6: Under the hypothesis of the preceding theorem, P((qlp) A (sir)) = P(p I p v r) P(qr'lp) + P(r I p v r) P(sp'lr) + P(qpsr I p v r).
Proof of Theorem 6: P((qlp) A (sir)) = P(qpr' v srp' v qpsr I p v r) = P(qpr' I p v r) + P(srp' I p v r) + P(qpsrlpv r) = P(p p v r) P((qr'Ip)I(p v r)) + P(r I p v r) P((sp'lr)l(p v r)) + P(qpsr I p v r) = P(p I p v r) P(qr'l p(p v r)) + P(r I p v r)P(sp'l r(p v r)) + P(qpsrl p v r) = P(p p v r) P(qr'lp) + P(r I p v r) P(sp'lr) + P(qpsr I p v r).
Note that the last term of the formulas of the last two theorems, namely P(qpsr I p v r),
can be expressed as P(pr I p v r) P(qs I pr).
In view of the very large sample spaces associated with even a small number of variables, it is not practical to attempt to enumerate possibilities and calculate probabilities and conditional probabilities from scratch. Formulas like those of Theorems 5 and 6 allowing local calculation of conditional probabilities via partitions are essential for practical determination of conditional probabilities in artificial intelligence applications. 
Varieties of
In terms of indicator functions, (p < q) is just functional inequality in the 2-element Boolean algebra. That is, (p < q) means p(co) < q(co), for all co e 2, where 0 < 1. Note that if p < q then easily q' < p' and for any proposition r, pr < qr and (p v r) < (q v r).
The converses are also true. In addition p < q if and only if p(' = 0.
Besides the two equivalent forms given above expressing "p entails q", there are at least two other ways to express p < q: According to the definition of equivalent conditionals, the proposition q is equivalent to p in the Boolean algebra L/p if and only if (qlp) = (pip), that is, if and only if qp = p, which is just p q. Thus, in L/p, q is equivalent to p if and only if q is entailed by p. We say that q is in the equivalence class generated by p. In other terminology, q is said to be in the filter class generated by p or in the sum ideal generated by p. This is the equivalence class <pip> = {q e L: p < q}. Thus, still another way to express "p entails q" is to say that q is in the sum ideal generated by p. Proof of Theorem 7: The proof follows by routine application of the operations to show reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. For example, reflexivity of <_^ follows from
The following two theorems express the inequalities (qlp) <A (sir) and (qlp) <!, (sir) in terms of the partial ordering on the original propositions. To prove the corollary to Theorem 9 note that if p < r and qp _< sr then qpp < srp = sp. So qp < sp. Conversely, if qp < sp and p < r then qp < sp < sr.
Note that as a consequence of Theorem 8 it turns out that (q v p') <A (qlP) since p < 1 and
Non-Monotonicity of Deduction: As appealing as this definition of entailment seems, it nevertheless appears at first to have a serious flaw, namely: If (qlp) <A (sir) then it does not follow that P(qlp) -P(sjr). This issue was brought to the attention of the author by H. T. Nguven and it also appears in Dubo's and Prade [20] , both suggesting that a deduction relation is inappropriate as an entailment relation in LI.L unless it is monotonic in the sense that if (qlp) entails (sir) then P(qlp) should riot be greater than P(slr). But <^ does not satisfy this relation:
For example, let p = 1, P(q) = 1/2, r = q' and s = q. Then easily (qlp) 5, (sir) but P(qlp) = 1/2 while P(sir) = 0. In fact, (q v p') <_ (qlp) but it was shown earlier that P(qjp) -P(q v p'), not the other way around. Nevertheless, in thinking about conditional logic and probability one must be flexible with one's conclusions. One must be "nonmonotonic" in one's thinking! It might at first seem obvious that (qlp) <^ (sir) should imply P(qlp) <-P(sjr). The idea comes swiftly to the mind and just as quickly to the tongue, but is it really so reasonable as a general rule?
Upon second thought, it seems to the author to be rather questionable whether one should insist that whenever one conditional (with its own premise and probability of application) entails a second conditional (with its own premise and probability of application) then their conditional probabilities must be so ordered. Rather, in the propagation of conditional probabilities through a network of logically related conditional propositions, one must perhaps allow for increasing or decreasing conditional probabilities. A similar observation can be made for -<v. For instance let 0 < P(q) < 1. Then (qlq) <!v (qll), i.e., (qlq) disjunctively implies (q1l) because q _ 1 and< (q)1. However P(qll) = P(q) < 1
= P(qlq).
In its initial formulation non-mono tonicity [34] arises from the observation in probability theory that P(q I P A r ) can be less, more or equal to P(qlp) even though p A r entails p. The lack of monotonicity of _ A is also well exhibited by considering the two forms (qlp) and (q v p'). As shown earlier P(qlp) <-P(q v p'), but it is also true that (q v p') _<( qlp). On the other hand it is also easy to show that (qlp) <. v (q v p').
Nevertheless, if (qlp) -A (sir) then it has been shown that qp _ sr v r'. That is, whenever (qlp) is true then either (sir) is true or else r is false. It will later be shown that if (qlp) -<A (sir) then (q v p') _ (s v r') and so P(qlp) -P(q v p') < P(sr v r'). That is, if (qlp) -<A (sir) then P(qlp) < P(sr v r').
On the other hand, it is not even true in general that if (qlp) <v (sir) then P(qlp) < P(sr v r'). For instance, let 0 * q = p _< s 1 = r. So (qlp) <.v (sir). However P(qlp) = 1 > P(sr v r') = P(s).
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In addition to <A and <v there are at least two other candidates for expressing the notion that an arbitrary conditional (qlp) entails a second arbitrary conditional (sir). The following two definitions formalize these relations: Here again conditional implication ( <c) is non-monotonic in the sense that (qlp) c (sir)
does not imply P(qlp) < P(sjr). For instance, let p = 1, s = q, and r = q' with 0 < P(q) < 1.
Then (qlp) c (sir) since q v p' = q and s v r' = q. But P(qlp) = P(q) > 0 = P(sr).
For <c it is true that both (qlp) c (q v p') and (q v p') c (qlP) but clearly, (qlp) , (q v p'). Two propositions may conditionally imply each other without being equivalent.
Nevertheless, as is so for both <A and m, if (qlp) c (sir) then P(qlp) < P(sr v r'). That is, if (qlp) c (sir) then the probability that (qlp) is true is less than or equal to the probability that (sir) is true or undefined.
The following theorem and its corollaries give three equivalent ways to express that (qlp) materially implies (sir), i.e., that (qlp) <m (sir). qp sr and (qv p') < (sv r'), qp sr and rs' < pq'.
Clearly from the last two theorems, the statement "(sir) is true given (qlp) is true"
(conditional implication) is weaker than the statement that "either (sir) is true or (qlp)
is false" (material implication).
It is important here as before to determine whether (qlp) <m (sir) implies P(qlp) < P(slr). It was I. R. Goodman In view of the preceding, since (p)(qlp) < (r)(sir) is equivalent to pq _< sr, having the latter relation together with (qlp) <c (sir), which is equivalent to s'r < q'p, yields that P(qlp) < P(slr). If instead of (qlp) <c (sir), one has (qlp) <,v (sir), then again one has (qlp) <m (sir), and so again P(qlp) < P(slr) as well as p < r.
The following two theorems and the corollary relate conjunctive and conditional implication: Entailment in L/L: And so it seems that there are different entailments for different situations and most do not impose monotonicity of conditional probability.
From the preceding results it is easy to see the following relationships:
If (qlp) <m (sir) and r < p then (qIP) <, (sir) for which -c holds in both directions, a partial ordering arises. However this entails making (qlp) and (q v p') equivalent, which is not desirable except when both are certain.
The following theorem gives three ways to express the fact that two conditional propositions are equivaleit. the LUB of (qlp) and (sir).
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To show that (qlp) A (sir) = [(q v p')(s v r')] I (p v r) is the GLB of (qlp) arid (s r), first note that both p _ p v r and r _ p v r. Furthermore, (q v p')(s v r')p -(qp v 0)(s v r') = qp(s v r') < qp. Similarly, (q v p')(s v r')r = (q v p')(sr v 0) -sr.
Therefore (q v p')(s v r') I (p v r) is a lower bound for (qlp) and (sir). Now if (11u) is any lower bound of (qlp) and (sir) then both p < u and r _ u, and so (p v r) -u.
Furthermore, since both tp < qp and r < sr, then both t < q v p' and t sv r'. This follows from t = tp v lp' _< qp v p' _< qpv p' = q v p' and t = trv tr' -sr v tr'
_ sr v r' = s v r'. Therefore, t < (q v p')(s v r').
Thus (tlu) -^ (tI p v r) <.
(q v p')(s v r') I (p v r) because (p v r) < u and (p v r)t _ (p v r)(q v p')(s v r').
This completes the proof of Theorem 18. While disjunctive implication establishes a full lattice in LIL, it doesn't appear to be universally appropriate for purposes of enbiqlment. For instqnce consider the two conditionals (PIP) and (pll) where p 1. Then clearly (PIP) 5v (pll). But (pip) is certain or undefined whereas (pll) is just p, and so is uncertain and possibly improbable but it is wholly defined. Nevertheless, -, is appropriate in some circumstances. So -m is operations of Theorem 2, this compound conditional reduces to "the roll will be five or six" and has probability 2/6 or 1/3, which corresponds nicely with intuition. See also H.
Prade and D. Dubois [20] concerning a comparison of these operations.
As mentioned earlier, still another way to express "p entails q" is to say "q is in the equivalence class (sum ideal, filter class) generated by p". In symbols this is q E <p>. 
Now in a Boolean
where the right hand side is just another way of writing (qlp) <c (sir).
Note that it follows from Definition 12 that the conditionals (qlp) and (01pq') and the simple proposition (q v p'), which is equal to (q v p' i 1), all generate the same equivalence class in L/L, namely <q v p'>. If this seems strange recall that these conditionals are equivalent only when they are wholly true, i.e. certain, not when they are merely possible, i.e., having a non-zero probability.
In view of all the foregoing it appears that entailment of conditionals by conditionals is fairly well described in L/L by conditional implication (<c) even though the lack of antisymmetry means that conditional implication in both directions is not the same as
